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ARBITRATIONS AND APPRAISALS INITHE
MISSOURI COURTS
GEORGE WILLIAM FOSTER, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
Arbitral proceedings recommend themselves in many circumstances
because they can provide speedy, efficient and economical means of
resolving private disputes. Where the parties accept and act upon
the award rendered, these advantages usually obtain. Where, on the
other hand, there is a refusal to go forward with the proceedings
agreed upon, or a refusal to abide an award, a recourse to the courts
is the probable next step, with the usual result that the advantages of
speed and economy are greatly, if not altogether, dissipated.
A survey, then, of court opinions dealing with arbitration matters
is primarily a study of breakdowns, real or alleged, in the arbitral
arrangement. Such a study of appellate opinions necessarily pre-
sents a somewhat warped picture of Missouri arbitration because
the emphasis is almost entirely upon the pitfalls of common-law or
statutory rules relating to arbitration, or upon the failure of the
parties or the arbitrators to abide those rules. Almost no emphasis
is placed upon arbitrations which do work, quietly and efficiently,
and are accepted by the parties.
The reception of the common law in Missouri at the outset brought
with it the prevailing common-law views toward arbitration. These,
in broadest outline, break down into two categories. First, the agree-
ment to submit a dispute to arbitration had little standing in court;
either party was free to revoke the submission agreement at any
time prior to rendition of the award; the other party could not compel
specific performance; and the revoking party was not answerable in
damages for his revocation. Second, the award was entitled to con-
siderable standing once it was rendered; the award could be made
the subject of an action, and a judgment entered upon it; the award
could be pleaded in bar to an action upon the same matter; and the
finality of the award could be avoided both at law and equity only by
a limited number of defenses which went primarily to defects in
procedures followed by the arbitrators.
The earliest Missouri arbitration statute appeared in 1825.1 It
was, on the whole, a loosely drafted and primitive affair. In substance
it provided that the parties could file their submission agreement in
circuit court, have it made a rule of court, and an award rendered
under such a submission could thereafter be entered as a judgment of
t Assistant Professor of Law. University of Wisconsin, School of Law.
1. Mo. REV. STAT. p. 137 et seq., §§ 1-7 (1825).
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the circuit court on the motion of the prevailing party. Whether the
statute intended to make the submission irrevocable, once made a rule
of court, does not appear. The award rendered under such a sub-
mission was "void" when procured by "corruption or undue means."
The Act of 1825 was replaced a decade later by a more elaborate
statute2 when the Legislature adopted "substantially, the New York
revised act."3 The Act of 1885 has undergone only one important
change since that time: the addition in 1909 of the section now en-
titled, "Agreement to arbitrate no bar to suit."14 Otherwise, statutory
arbitrations in Missouri rock along in a vehicle new in the Jacksonian
Era, good so far as it goes, but accomplishing only half the job done
by its modern counterparts in other states. It is reasonably abreast
of present-day legislation in so far as it provides a summary motion
practice for modifying, vacating or confirming a statutory award
and entering judgment upon it. But it leaves expressly in force the
common-law rule that agreements to submit to arbitration are revo-
cable, a rule which modern statutes have flatly reversed by providing
that agreements to submit present or future disputes are specifically
enforceable through summary motion proceedings.
The Missouri statute does not abolish common-law arbitrations.
The parties may elect either the common-law or statutory proceeding,
the difference being primarily that the statute imposes more stringent
procedural formalities as the price paid for the greatly simplified
motion practice for testing finality of the award and entering judg-
ment upon it. Whether a particular submission agreement contem-
plates a statutory or a common-law proceeding is not always clear,
and this question has been a subject of frequent litigation.
And finally, the Missouri arbitration statute is silent on the subject
of appraisals. Like the common-law arbitration, the appraisal is also
a creature of the common law. None of the legal distinctions between
appraisals and arbitrations is wholly satisfactory. Agreements which
the courts have denominated as appraisals occur most frequently
where the matter referred to third parties for determination is (a)
the fixing of a value for property transferred under a contract to
purchase and sell; (b) the periodic adjustment of rent under a long-
term lease or upon renewal of the lease; and (c) the evaluation of loss
or damage under a fire policy.
Conflicting reasons have been asserted for setting these categories
apart as appraisals, with the result that more or less comparable
2. Mo. R v. STAT. p. 71 et se-q., §§ 1-25 (1835).
3. The quoted language is that of the Missouri Supreme Court in Bridgman v.
Bridgman, 2S Mo. 272, 274 (1856). A comparison of the 1835 Missouri Act with
the then existing New York statute supports the court's observation. See 2 N.Y.
Ro . STAT. p. 541 et seq., §§ 1-25 (1829).
4. Mo. RaV. STAT. § 868 (1909); now Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1949).
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fact situations in one case may be treated as an appraisal, and in
another as an arbitration. Upon two points, however, the cases
uniformly agree: (a) an appraisal is "something less than an arbitra-
tion" ;' and (b) the procedural rules regulating arbitrations do not
apply to appraisals.,
The leading Missouri case on appraisals, Dworkin v. Caledonian
In". Co., 7 concludes that the "fundamental difference" between ap-
praisals and arbitrations "lies in the procedure to be followed, and
appraisals and arbitrations "lies in the procedure to be followed, and
the effect of the findings." This rule was to be applied by ascertain-
ing from the contract entered into by the parties whether it was in-
tended that arbitration procedures were to be followed, or merely the
less formal procedures of an appraisal. The rule is easy enough to
apply where the contract sufficiently stipulates the procedures in-
tended, but is virtually useless where the contract merely indicates
that there shall be an "arbitration" or an "appraisal." This is par-
ticularly true in view of the occasional tendency to use the words
"appraisal" and "arbitration" more or less interchangeably in opin-
ions in which the procedural distinctions between the two are not re-
garded as material to the outcome of the case.8
THE SuBMIsSIoN AGREEMENT
An agreement to arbitrate a dispute is a contract, and a party
seeking to enforce an award under it has the burden of pleading and
proving ".... not only the award, but also the submission." 9
The submission agreement may serve a number of purposes, chief
among them being (a) to define the dispute submitted; (b) to deter-
mine the number of arbitrators and name or fix the mode of selecting
them; (c) to establish particular procedures desired by the parties
during the arbitral hearing, e.g., right to be represented by counsel,
or to cross-examine witnesses; (d) to determine the number of arbi-
trators who must concur in the award rendered (and if an umpire is
to be called, in the event of disagreement among the arbitrators, to
define his role) ; and (e) if a statutory proceeding is contemplated, to
designate the particular court in which judgment is to be rendered
upon the award.
Common-Law and Statutory Submissions Distinguished. If the
submission is oral, the arbitration will be governed by common-law
5. Zallee v. The Laclede Mut. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 44 Mo. 530, 532 (1869).
6. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (1920).
7. Ibid.
8. See Tureman v. Altman, 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (1951), where the
submission agreement spoke of "appraisers" and an "appraisement," and Orr v.
Hail Ins. Co., 356 Mo. 372, 201 S.W.2d 952 (1947), where the submission provided
for an "arbitration."
9. Thatcher Implement & Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 634,
187 S.W. 117, 120 (1916).
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rules, since the Missouri arbitration statute requires that the sub-
mission be "by instrument of writing.' ' I° Some earlier cases held any
written submission to be within the statute,11 but later cases have
recognized particular written agreements as lying outside the statute,
and hence to be governed by common-law rules.
Thus, to be a written agreement within the statute, it must be
signed by both parties, and where only one party has signed the agree-
ment, it has been held to be a common-law submission.12 But where
each party signed a separate bond, agreeing to submit a defined
dispute, and gave his'bond to the other party, the bonds have been
read together as constituting a written submission within the stat-
ute.13
The statute provides that the parties "may" designate in their
submission agreement a particular court in which judgment may be
rendered upon the award,14 and therefore the failure to make such a
designation does not take a written submission outside the statute.15
At least one case has suggested that where an arbitral proceeding
under a written submission, fails to conform to the procedural re-
quirementi of the statute, the validity of the award will be determined
by common-law rules.2 In holding that a parol award rendered
under a written submission was a bar to a subsequent suit involving
the same dispute, the Court said in Dickens v. Luke: "It is conceded
that the arbitration was not had according to the law providing for a
statutory arbitration; hence we shall proceed on the theory that the
arbitration was a common-law arbitration."7 The court did not de-
velop its reason for ruling as it did, and the result could be justified
either on the theory that the parties revoked their written submis-
sion and entered a new parol agreement, or that they waived the
procedural requirements of the statute.
Whlt Causes May Be Submitted. A valid common-law submission
is limited to controversies existing when the agreement to arbitrate
10. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.020 (1949) provides as follows:
All persons except infants and persons of unsound mind, may, by instru-
ment of writing, submit to the decision of one or more arbitrators any con-
troversy which may be existing between them, which might be the subject
of an action, and may, in such submission, agree that a judgment of any
circuit or other court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to be desig-
nated in such'submission, shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant
to such submission.
11. Valle v. North Missouri R.R., 37 Mo. 445 (1866); Bridgman v. Bridgman,
23 Mo. 272 (1856).
12. Williams v. Perkins, 83 Mo. 379 (1884).
13. Reeves v. McGlochlin, 65 Mo. App. 537 (1896).
14. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.020 (1949). See -note 10 supra, for full text.
15. Wolfe v. Hyatt, 76 Mo. 156. (1882). Contra: Finley v. Finley, 11 Mo. 624(1848).




is entered into, and an agreement made at a time when no dispute
exists is not a good common-law submission. s
The statute provides that the parties may submit "1... any con-
troversy which may be existing between them, which might be the
subject of an action. .. ."9 This calls for the dual requirement (a)
that only existing controversies may be submitted under the statute;
and (b) that the controversy be one which might be taken cognizance
of by the courts. There is no requirement at the common law that the
controversy submitted be one which would otherwise constitute a
cause of action.
The distinctions just made are well developed in Continental Bank
Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders.20 In that
case, the parties attempting to negotiate a contract of employment
had been unable to agree upon the terms to be ind1uded, and they
agreed in writing to submit their dispute to arbitration. It was held
that because the courts cannot make a specific contract for the parties
where none existed, the controversy was not one which could become
the subject of an action, and hence the submission, although in
writing, was not within the statute. The agreement was held valid
as a common-law submission, the court saying that ". . . any civil
controversy, whether constituting a cause of action or not, can be sub-
mitted to arbitration [at the common law].... ."21
Although under the statute the controversy submitted must be one
which might be the subject of an action, this has not been limited to
money claims. Thus, where the controversy involved a dispute over
the construction of a term in a contract existing between the parties,
an agreement in writing to arbitrate the disputed question of con-
struction was held to be a submission within the statute; the award
rendered was confirmed in a statutory proceeding; and the parties
were bound by the arbitrators' construction in a subsequent action
brought on the disputed contract itself.22
Parol submissions at the common law are limited by the statute of
frauds. In the early case of Hamin v. Duke23 the court laid down
the following rule: "By the common law when the subject matter is
such that a parol agreement between the parties would be valid, a
verbal submission and award will be binding upon them."24 Subse-
18. Zallee v. Laclede Mut. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 44 Mo. 530 (1869) ; Curry v.
Lackey, 35 Mo. 389 (1865); Garred v. Macey & Doniphan, 10 Mo. 161 (1846).
Hinkle v. Harris, 34 Mo. App. 223 (1889) semble.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.020 (1949). See note 10 supra, for full text.
20. 239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947).
21. id. at 1253, 201 S.W.2d at 534.
22. E. E. Souther Iron Co. v. Laclede Power Co. of St; Louis, 109 Mo. App. 353,
84 S.W. 450 (1904).
23. 28 Mo. 166 (1859).
24. Id. at 168.
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quently, the rule was narrowed to apply only to such parol agree-
ments lying wholly outside the statute of frauds and a parol submis-
sion and award were held invalid where the controversy submitted in-
volved the alleged breach of a contract voidable, but not void, under
the statute25 But where a tenant under a lease for a term of years
had disputed the share of the crop owing the landlord for a particular
year, and this controversy was orally submitted to arbitration, the
parol award rendered was held valid for the reason that no question
involving the term of the lease had been submitted28
Pending court actions may also be submitted under the statute. The
submission agreement may then be entered as a rule of court with
provision that judgment will be entered upon the award. Such a sub-
mission of a pending action works a dismissal of the suit whether an
award is rendered thereafter or not.27 Such a submission which is
made a rule of court is merely a plea in abatement of the then pending
action, and for purposes of confirming, modifying or vacating the
award under statutory procedures the original action may be re-
opened and judgment entered.28 But while the submission operates as
a dismissal of the original action, it is not a bar to new action on the
same matter unless a valid award has been made.29 And the unsuccess-
ful party to the award is not confined to statutory motions to modify
or vacate the award; he may bring a new action to set aside the award
on equitable grounds provided such action is begun prior to the filing
of a motion to confirm the award by the successful party. 0
Revocability and Court Action After Revocation of Submission.
Common-law agreements to submit to arbitration are revocable
.. . at any time before the award is announced... . ",
Until 1909 the Missouri arbitration statutes had been silent on the
question whether statutory submissions to arbitration were revocable.
In that year the legislature passed an act providing that contracts to
arbitrate shall not preclude filing of suit.82 Interestingly, the act was
not adopted as an amendment to the existing arbitration statute, but
rather as an amendment to ".... chapter 10 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri, 1899, relating to contracts and promises .. ."1 In the
Revised Statutes of 1909, however, the act was added as a new sec-
25. Bunnell v. Reynolds, 205 Mo. App. 653, 226 S.W. 614 (1920).
26. Donnell v. Lee, 58 Mo. App. 288 (1894).
27. Bowen v. Lazalere, 44 Mo. 383 (1869).
28. Shawhan v. Baker, 167 Mo. App. 25, 150 S.W. 1096 (1912).
29. Hyatt v. Wolfe, 22 Mo. App. 191 (1886).
30. Shawhan v. Baker, 167 Mo. App. 25, 150 S.W. 1096 (1912).
31. Donnell v. Lee, 58 Mo. App. 288, 297 (1894).




tion to the chapter on arbitration,3' and not as an amendment to the
chapter on contracts and promises.31
A summary of cases dealing with revocability which had been
decided prior to the 1909 act will perhaps explain in part the reasons
for its adoption. King v. Howard"6 stated the general rule thus:
An agreement for arbitration is, in its nature, revocable, and
though an award when made will be enforced, parties will not
be compelled to submit a controversy to arbitrators, nor will they
be compelled to perform an agreement for that purpose after
they have made it.37
And this rule, refusing specific performance of the submission agree-
ment, was followed in later cases which made no attempt to dis-
tinguish between common-law and statutory submisison agreements.3 8
One case, Black v. Rogers,' stands alone for the proposition that
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate would be allowed.
The controversy there began as a proceeding in ejectment. While the
suit was pending, the parties entered a compromise agreement under
which the land was to be taken by one party and the other was to be
paid an amount to be determined by arbitration. Black filed a bill in
equity reciting the compromise agreement and Rogers' refusal to
arbitrate. The trial court decreed that title to the land was in the
defendant, ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, and provided
further that if arbitrators were not appointed, the value of the land
should be fixed by court-appointed commissioners. The decree was
affirmed on appeal. The supreme court conceded that as a general
rule agreements to arbitrate were not specifically enforceable but
said that an exception exists:
This exception occurs when the essence of the agreement does
not consist in the fixing of a value by arbitrators, but the fixing
of such value is merely subsidiary or auxiliary to the principal
agreement.
The kind of problem posed by Black v. Rogers, supra, had long
vexed the Missouri courts when it came to the question of applying
the rule that agreements to arbitrate were revocable. In the run-of-
the-mill case, revocation by one of the parties prior to rendition of
an award worked no substantial hardship; if the controversy were
one which could be made the subject of an action, either party was
free to take the dispute to court after revocation; or he could revoke
simply by bringing an action prior to rendition of an award.
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 868 (1909).
35. See "Chapter 29. Contracts and Promises," Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 2769-2780(1909).
36. 27 Mo. 21 (1858).
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. City of St. Louis v. Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879); Hug v. Van Burkleo,
58 Mo. 202 (1874); Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153 (1873).
39. 75 Mo. 441 (1882).
40. Id. at 449.
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On the other hand, there did exist a more or less limited area in
which substantial hardship would result by holding the submission
agreement wholly revocable. Typical of these were provisions in
leases under which the lessor promised to pay at the end of the term
for improvements made by the lessee, the parties agreeing in advance
that the value of the improvements was to be fixed by arbitrators. If
the lessor were permitted to revoke the submission, there would be
no way left under the contract for determining the value of the
improvements, and thus a forfeiture would be worked against the
lessee. To prevent this, a court of equity could compel the taking of
an account, although it refused relief in the form of compelling the
parties to proceed to arbitration.4
While such a solution denied specific performance of the submission
agreement, it was not without its logical difficulties. The parties had
entered a contract to buy and sell, leaving to third parties the task
of determining a material term of the agreement in a particular way,
and court intervention to fix the price did so in a manner altogether
different from the fashion in which the contract provided. Thus,
where a contract to buy and sell at a price to be fixed by arbitrators
remained wholly executory when equitable relief was sought, the
court refused to intervene on the grounds that, the agreement re-
maining executory, no contract existed until arbitrators had fixed
the price.4 2
But in other cases involving submission of the question of value,
the courts freely intervened when the arbitration provision failed.
They did so where leases with renewal options provided that rental
under the renewed lease was to be fixed by disinterested third parties,
and arbitration failed.43 In Keating v. Korfhage," the value of a
party wall was fixed in an equitable proceding. And willingness was
expressed to fix rental values under long-term leases where the parties
had agreed to adjust the rent periodically by arbitration,4" but equi-
table intervention was refused in the absence of a showing of fraud
where in the long-term lease it was provided that the rent was to con-
tinue at the old rate until arbitration was had."6
In another context, unrelated to the question of revocability, the
courts were confronted with the problem whether agreements to sub-
mit questions as to value of property were, in a technical sense,
41. Hug v. Van Burkleo, 58 Mo. 202 (1874).
42. City of St. Louis v. Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879).
43. Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153 (1873); Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo,. 25
(1869).
44. 88 Mo. 524 (1885).
45. Holmes v. Shepard, 49 Mo. 600 (1872); Strohmaier v. Zeppenfeld, 3 Mo.
App. 429 (1877). See Turemian v. Altman, 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (1951),
for a recent application of the same principle.
46. Biddle v. McDonough, 15 Mo. App. 532 (1884). Bales v. Gilbert, 84 Mo.
App. 675 (1900) semble.
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arbitrations at all. Because of the rule earlier discussed that only
existing controversies could be submitted under the statute or at
common law, some agreements in leases or contracts to buy and sell
providing that the price or value of the property involved shall be
fixed by third parties were held not to be submissions to arbitration
for the reason that no controversy existed when the contract or lease
was agreed upon.47 If the particular agreement in each case was
not an arbitration, what was it? Zallee v. The Laclede Mut. Fire &
Marine Ins. Co.,4' gave it a name: "an appraisal only.., something
less than an arbitration."' 9
But not every agreement to have third parties fix price or value
could be distinguished as an "appraisal" by the test that no contro-
versy existed when the agreement was made, and other distinctions
were found. The Zallee case, supra, pointed out that the submission
of the question of loss sustained by fire did not embrace the ultimate
question of the insurer's liability under a fire policy, and that such
an "award" as to fire damage did not merge with the cause of action;
hence no action could be brought on the award itself, but rather upon
the contract of insurance, with the award being conclusive as to the
question of loss. Elsewhere, agreements to have value fixed by third
parties were distinguished as appraisals on the ground that value
was merely incidental to the main purpose of the contract, and left
open the matter of liability under the contract itself, hence differing
from an arbitration in that it did not oust the courts of jurisdiction
over the controversy00
None of the distinctions just discussed is altogether satisfactory
in setting appraisals apart from arbitrations, and the distinctions
between the two categories is not made clearer in many of the cases
just cited by the fact that the courts themselves used the words "arbi-
tration" and "appraisal" more or less interchangeably in discussing
a particular agreement held not to be an appraisal in the technical
sense. Indeed, the court in Black v. Rogers" appeared to be discuss-
ing what other decisions had termed "appraisals" when it referred
to the fixing of value by "arbitrators" as merely "secondary or auxili-
ary to the principal agreement!'
Thus, there existed by the middle 1890's a body of decisions involv-
ing agreements that third parties were to fix value, price or damage
as one of the incidents of a contract of sale, or lease, or insurance.
47. Leonard v. Cox, 64 Mo. 32 (1876); Zallee v. The Laclede AMut. Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 44 Mo. 530 (1869); Garred v. Macey & Doniphan, 10 Mo. 161(1846).
48, 44 Mo. 530 (1869).
49. Id. at 532.
50. McNees v. The Southern Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 335 (1895); Striohmaier v.
Zeppenfeld, 3 Mo. App. 429 (1877).
51, 75 Mo. 441 (1882).
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While the identity of these agreements to fix value was not too clearly
defined, they were regarded as something other than agreements to
arbitrate in a statutory or common-law sense. And these "appraisals"
were revocable in that the parties were free to take the dispute as to
value to court when the arbitral proceeding failed. True, the isolated
case of Blal v. Rogers2 had held one agreement to fix value irrevo-
cable and had decreed specific performance of the agreement, but the
case has never since that time been followed in this point. And in
City of St. Louis v. Gaslight Co.P the court had refused to intervene
and fix value where a contract to sell at a price to be determined by
arbitrators remained wholly executory. Otherwise, the "appraisal
agreements" were no bar to a suit.
On the other hand, another line of cases, never regarded as arbitra-
tions, had held that provisions requiring certificates of approval
from architects or engineers were conditions precedent to suit on the
contract.5 It was, apparently, the fire insurance policy which brought
over this "condition precedent" doctrine into the area more commonly
regarded as arbitration or appraisal. The possibilities which the
doctrine afforded for cutting down the revocability of agreements to
fix value by arbitration or appraisal were obvious. If the insured
could be barred from suit until third parties had ascertained the
amount of loss sustained, he would be bound by the amount thus fixed
and the issue of loss would thereby be kept from the jury. It provided
an indirect means of compelling the insured to go through with the
arbitral proceeding, enforced by depriving him of the right to sue on
the policy until he had done so.
The first cases squarely presenting the question of revocability of
conditions in fire policies requiring submission of the question of loss
in event of disagreement were the companion cases of Murphy v.
North-m British & Mercantile Co., 5 and McNees v'. Southern. Ins.
Co.,56 handed down the same day by the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
Both cases involved suits by the insured on fire policies which pro-
vided that ".... no suit or action on this policy (shall be sustained)
until after full compliance . . . with all the foregoing require-
52. 75 Mo. 441 (1882).
53. 70 Mo. App. 69 (1879).
54. St. Joseph Iron Co. v. Helverson, 48 Mo. App. 383 (1892); Roy v. Boteler,
40 Mo. App. 213 (1890). But compare Williams v. Chicago, Santa Fe & California
Ry., 112 Mo. 463, 20 S.W. 631 (1892), where the court, speaking of the finality of
an engineer's certificate, observed that:
By such a stipulation, the parties constitute the engineer an arbitrator,
and the provision is held, if anything, more binding than an ordinary sub-
mission, for the reason that it enters into, and becomes a part of the con-
sideration of the contract, without which it would not in all probability
have been made.
Id. at 487, 20 S.W. at 637.
55. 61 Mo. App. 323 (1895).
56. 61 Mo. App. 335 (1895).
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ments. . . " It was one of those requirements that "... in the event
of disagreement as to the amount of loss, the same shall. . .be ascer-
tained by two competent and disinterested appraisers... [who shall]
appraise the loss .... " Although the policy spoke of appraisers in-
stead of arbitrators, the court responded in the Murphy case in the
following language of arbitration:
By the provisions of this policy, whenever the parties to the
contract failed to agree on the amount of the loss, then it was
to be settled by arbitration. The provision is absolute and manda-
tory. And such contracts being in the interest of amicable ad-
justments of disputes which must otherwise become the subject
of vexatious controversy and litigation, are upheld by the courts.
[Citations of cases from Minnesota, Michigan and Illinois
omitted.] "It was, therefore. ... a condition precedent to a lia-
bility by defendant to plaintiff that there should have been a.n
adjustment by arbitration of the sum, due plaintif."59 [Italics
added.]
The companion MeNees case, supra, placed a limitation upon the
condition precedent doctrine by confining its operation to amount of
loss or damage, and stating that the doctrine did not apply where
"... all matters pertaining to the cause of action ....." are submitted
to arbitration.60
Even limiting the Mutphy and McNees cases to the determination
of amount of loss or value, as distinguished from arbitration of an
entire cause of action, it seems clear that agreements to arbitrate a
particular class of disputes were bestowed a new vitality. True, the
rule did not grant specific performance of the submission agree-
ment, but indirectly it did compel the parties to arbitrate the loss
or stay out of court.
The doctrine, on the other hand, was not enlarged to incorporate
an agreement to arbitrate an entire cause of action. In White v.
Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,' the Kansas City Court of Appeals which
had decided the Murphy and McNees cases, refused, eight years
later, to apply the condition precedent doctrine in a case where a
condition in a fire policy prohibited the insured from going to court
and required him to submit all questions of liability to arbitration.
Curiously, however, the result was not grounded on the limitation
of the MeNees case against applying the condition precedent doctrine
where the entire cause of action was submitted to arbitration, but
rather on the proposition that the insurer's charter expressly pro-
vided that the company could sue and be sued.
57. Murphy v. Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323, 329
1895).
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. at 329.
60. McNees v. Southern Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 335, 340 (1895).
61. 97 Mo. App. 590, 71 S.W. 707 (1903).
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The condition precedent doctrine was, however, extended to cover
agreements to arbitrate the value of improvements to the leasehold
upon expiration of the lease in Bales v. Gilbert,62 where it was held
that the mere failure to reach an "award" without showing fault on
the part of the lessor was not sufficient to constitute a waiver of the
condition precedent upon the lessee's right to sue.
Promising as the condition precedent rule appeared to be as a
means of compelling arbitration (or appraisal) in insurance cases,
it proved to be of little practical value. From the decisions of the
Murphy and McNees cases in 1895 through 1908, the year before
passage of the revocability statute, 3 only one 4 of the twenty-two
appellate cases found involving the condition precedent question in
cases on fire insurance policies actually held that the insurer had not
waived the condition. Under a broad policy of strict construction of
conditions against the insurer, one waiver exception after another
was engrafted on the condition precedent doctrine, and the insured
was permitted to bring his action on the policy. Indeed, after remand,
both the Murphy and McNees cases came back and were sustained on
the ground that the insurer had waived the condition.0
About the only real effect of the doctrine in these years was to
make much more cumbersome the trial of actions on fire policies. And
in any event, the doctrine had not in that period been expanded to
reach submission agreements other than those involving the deter-
mination of loss as part of a larger contract.
It appears almost certain, therefore, that the legislature had in
mind the reversal of the Murphy and MeNees cases in adopting what
became Section 868 of the Revised Statutes of 1909. This conclusion
is strengthened by comparing the language of the statute with that
of the court in the Murphy case. In the Murphy case, the court had
stated:
It was, therefore.., a condition precedent to a liability by de-
fendant to plaintiff that there should have been an adjustment
by arbitration of the sum due plaintiff.06 [Italics added.]
The language of the Act of 1909 follows:
Any contract or agreement hereafter entered into containing any
clause or provision providing for an adjustment by arbitration
shall not preclude any party or beneficiary under such contract
.or agreement from instituting suit or other legal action on such
62. 84 Mo. App. 675 (1900).
63. See note 32 supra.
64. Stevens v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 88, 96 S.W. 684(1906).
65. Murphy v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 70 Mo. App. 78 (1897);
McNees v. Southern Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 232 (1897).
66. Murphy v. Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323, 329 (1895)
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contract at any time, and the compliance with such clause or pro-
vision shall not be a condition precedent to the right to bring or
recover in such action.6 7 [Italics added.]
As earlier indicated, the Act was made a part of the arbitration
statute,"8 and in 1920, a divided supreme court held, in Dworkin v.
Caledonian Ins. Co.,69 that the statute applied only to arbitrations in
a technical sense, and not to appraisals.
Dworkin had brought an action to recover under a fire insurance
policy for loss sustained. The trial court had instructed the jury that
Dworkin was not "... required to enter into an appraisal with the
defendant as to the amount of loss." 70 The insurer objected to this
instruction on the ground that the revocability provision in the arbi-
tration statute applied only to arbitrations, and not to appraisals.
On appeal, the court considered the various distinctions suggested
in earlier cases as separating appraisals from arbitrations, viz., that
no controversy existed when the agreement to fix value was made;
that the fixing of value left open the ultimate question of liability
under the contract; that fixing value merely settles a matter subsidi-
ary or incidental to the contract. Each of these was rejected as the
true distinction between appraisals and arbitrations for the reason
that no one of the above distinctions was common to every situation
in which submission agreements were held to be appraisals. The
court then went on to lay down what it regarded as the true distinc-
tion:
In our opinion the fundamental difference between the two pro-
ceedings lies in the procedure to be followed, and the effect of the
findings. An agreement to arbitrate is really an agreement be-
tween parties who are in a controversy, or look forward to the
possibility of being in one,7 to substitute a tribunal other than
the courts of the land to determine their rights. Arbitrators,
like a judicial tribunal, must give notice to the parties of the time
and place of the hearing of the controversy, and must listen to
and decide upon the evidence offered by the parties; and the
original cause of action becomes merged with the award, which
may be declared upon at common law as a new demand, or, under
our statute, judgment may be entered upon it by the court des-
ignated. In the case of a simple appraisal of values or amount
of loss, the appraisers, if they wish, may hear what others have to
say on the question they are to determine but unless the reference
so provides, they are not bound to take testimony and may decide
67- Mo. Laws 1909, p. 347.
68. See text at note 34 supra.
69. 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (1920).
70. V4. at 353, 226 S.W. at 847.
71. This statement suggests that in Missouri, agreements to submit future
controve)sies are valid. No case found so holds. See text to notes 18 and 19
supra.
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from their own knowledge or opinion. Neither does their award
create a new cause of action, but the liability of one party to the
other is still upon the contract.72
Under the distinction that the difference lies in the "procedures to
be followed and the effect of the findings," it is a question of the
intention of the parties, to be determined from the submission agree-
ment they make. Holding that the parties to the contract of insur-
ance in the Dworkin case did not intend to submit the determination
of loss to either a common-law or statutory arbitration, the court
concluded that the provision in the policy called for an appraisal
instead.
The question then was whether the provision in the arbitration
statute annulling any clause for "an adjustment by arbitration" ap-
plied to appraisals. And this was answered by holding that the statute
applied only to what were, in a technical sense, arbitrations, and not
to appraisals. Hence- the instruction to the jury that the insured
did not have to comply with the appraisal clause in the policy was
held in error.
Thus, the Dworkin case restored the validity of the condition
precedent doctrine by holding that appraisals were unaffected by the
statute. But few insurance policy cases thereafter raised the condi-
tion precedent question. In Lance v. Royal Ins. Co.,73 a suit by the
insured on the policy was barred for failure to comply with the
appraisal clause; but in other cases where the condition precedent
rule was re-affirmed, the cases themselves actually held that the in-
surer had waived the condition.74 And in Mc anu v. Farmers Mut.
Haril Ins. Co.,7" where the policy called for "arbitrators" to fix the
amount of loss or determine "whethef there was any loss at all," the
Dworkin case was distinguished and the parties were held to have
intended to "arbitrate" the loss, thus making the condition in the
policy revocable under the statute.
In summary of matters dealing with revocability of submission
agreements, the following conclusions appear warranted: Common-
law submissions to arbitration have been traditionally regarded as
revocable by notice or action prior to rendition of a valid award.
Although the arbitration statute was silent on the point prior to 1909,
statutory submissions were understood throughout that earlier period
to be similarly revocable; and since 1909 they have been expressly
so. The Dworkin case, by setting appraisals apart, has limited the
72. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 34% 356, 357, 226 S.W. 846, 848
(1920).
73. 259 S.W. 535 (Mo. App. 1924).
74. Schusterman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 253 S.W. 85 (Mo. App. 1923);
Security Printing v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 245 S.W. 1089 (Mo. App. 1922);
Security Printing v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Mo. App. 422, 240 S.W. 263 (1922).
75. 239 Mo. App. 882, 203 S.W.2d 107 (1947).
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revocability of submissions for appraisal of value or loss by keeping
alive the condition precedent doctrine. That doctrine, almost ex-
clusively confined to insurance cases which expressly made the ap-
praisal clause a condition precedent to suit, apparently has not spread
to other types of submissions which might have been regarded as
appraisals under the Dworkin rule. And in the recent case of Ture-
onan r. Alhnan,'" where a provision in a long-term lease called for
"appraisers" to make periodic "appraisement" of the rent, equitable
relief was granted when the trial court which had fixed the rental
value was sustained after efforts at appraisement failed. The opinion
left quite unclear whether the agreement was an appraisal or an
arbitration, and made no reference to cases in actions at law in which
submission to appraisal had been held conditions precedent to suit.
THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDING
Arbitrators and Appraisers: Agents, or Disinterested Judges? As
will appear more fully below, both arbitrators and appraisers are
expected to act as fair and impartial observers in deciding the
matter submitted to them. But if from the outset both parties to
the controversy choose to treat the arbitrators they have selected as
their personal agents in settling the dispute, neither will be permitted
thereafter to object to the partiality of the arbitrator selected by the
other party, and a statutory award thus rendered will not be set
aside on a motion to vacate for this reason.77 The net effect of such
a choice by the parties is, of course, to leave the burden of the decision
on the third arbitrator chosen by the first two.
The Missouri arbitration statute lists the following as causes for
which an award may be vacated:
(1) That such award was procured by corruption, fraud or
undue means;
(2) That there was evident partiality or corruption on the
1)art of the arbitrators, or any one of them;
(3) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear any evidence pertinent or material to the controversy,
or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party shall
have been prejudiced;
(4) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or that they
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite
award on the subject matter was not made7s
76. 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (1951).
77. Pope Construction Co. v. Highway Comm., 230 Mo. App. 502, 92 S.W.2d
7874 (1936).78, Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.100 (1949).
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The gist of the statutory rules just stated is that the arbitrators
must act in good faith in carrying out the task appointed them under
the submission agreement.
In this respect, the rule as to statutory and common-law arbitra-
tors is the same, the statute being looked upon as merely incorporat-
ing the rules under which the courts of equity had traditionally set
aside awards.79 And it was traditionally the view that only equity
could relieve from an award,80 so that in actions at law upon an award
prior to recognition of equitable defenses the plaintiff was entitled
to recover upon pleading and proving the making of the submission
agreement and the award."
Because arbitrators are not presumed to know the law, the fact
that in good faith they drew incorrect conclusions as to the facts or
law of the matter before them does not provide a basis for setting
aside the award at equity or under the statute. 2 The rule is sometimes
stated that the award would be set aside where an error of law or
fact could be established on the face of the award without resort to
extrinsic evidence.83 From the rules just stated, it follows that an
objection cannot be raised that the arbitrators heard evidence inad-
missible in a court,8' or that the award rendered was not supported
by evidence.83 On the other hand, refusal to hear pertinent and
material evidence may be probative of misconduct or partiality on
the part of the arbitrators.8
General allegations of fraud, partiality, or corruption are not
enough; the facts upon which the objections are based must be stated
specifically." While it early was said that an award would be set
aside for partiality only if it were "strikingly unjust," or "grossly
offensive,"'88 the rule laid down in Bennett's Adm'i. v. Russell,"9 that
the misbehavior or corruption must imply "an intention to do wrong,"
has been the rule followed. Thus, without more, an intention to do
79. Shawhan v. Baker, 167 Mo. App. 25, 150 S.W. 1096 (1912).
80. Finley v. Finley, 11 Mo. 624 (1848).
81. Thatcher Implement & Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187
S.W. 117 (1916).
82. Cochran v. Bartle, 91 Mo. 636, 3 S.W. 854 (1887) Bennett's Adm'r. v.
Russell, 34 Mo. 524 (1864); Bridgman v. Bridgman, 23 Mo. 272 (1856); New-
man v. Labeaume, 9 Mo. 30 (1845); Thatcher Implement & Mercantile Co. v.
Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187 S.W. 117 (1916).
83. Cochran v. Bartle, 91 Mo. 636, 3 S.W. 854 (1887); Vallee v. North Mo. R.R.,
37 Mo. 445 (1866); Beckett v. Wiglesworth, 178 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1915).
84. Bennett's Adm'r. v. Russell, 34 Mo. 524 (1864); Vaughn v. Graham, 11 Mo.
575 (1848); Beall v. Board of Trade of Kansas City, 164 Mo. App. 186, 148 S.W.
386 (1912).
85. Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter. 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W. 901 (1925);
Mitchell v. Curran, 1 Mo. App. 453 (1876).
86. See quoted portion of arbitration statute, paragraph (3), at note 78 supra.
87. Pope Construction Co. v. Highway Comm., 230 Mo. App. 502, 92 S.W.2d
974 (1936).
88. Newman v. Labeaume, 9 Mo. 30 (1845).
89. 34 Mo. 524 (1864).
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wrong is not shown where the arbitrators called back counsel for one
of the parties to ask him to point to the place in the record where
there could be found a point referred to in the counsel's brief ;90 or
where the arbitrator resided at the home of the opposing party while
conducting the arbitration ;9 or where the request to cross-examine
witnesses was refused ;9 or where the request that the parties be
represented by counsel during the arbitral proceeding was refused.P'
If at any time prior to rendition of the award, a party becomes
aware of facts constituting partiality or corruption on the part of
one of the arbitrators, he must take care that his conduct thereafter
does not amount to a waiver of objection on this point. Thus, where
a party, armed with knowledge that one arbitrator had been employed
by the other party until just prior to the arbitral hearing, makes no
objection to the partiality of that arbitrator until after the award is
rendered, the objection comes too late.9' Nor is it sufficient to allege
a want of knowledge of partiality at the time of entering the sub-
mission agreement; such an allegation does not foreclose the possibil-
ity that knowledge of this partiality was acquired prior to, or dur-
ing, the arbitral proceeding, and waived. 5
On the other hand, where knowledge of partiality was not acquired
until after the award was rendered, the party is free to raise this
objection at any time prior to confirmation of the award.9 6 But
where the unsuccessful party learns after the award is rendered of
the arbitrator's partiality, his subsequent ratification and adoption
of the award cures any defect arising out of the alleged partiality.97
In general, the same standards of fair play required of the arbitra-
tor are also required of the appraiser. There is, however, one sig-
nificant difference recognized in the cases: unless the submission
agreement calls for it, the appraiser does not need to give the parties
a hearing., Appraisers are not "required or expected to hear
testimony"; rather, appraisers are experts who are ". . . chosen be-
cause of their peculiar knowledge to view and value the property
90. Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448 (1877).
91. Allen v. Hickam, 156 Mo. 49, 56 S.W. 309 (1900).
92. Penn. Iron Works v. East St. Louis Ice Co., 96 Mo. App. 563, 70 S.W. 903(1902).
93. Ibid.; Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W. 901(1925).
94. Pope Construction Co. v. Highway Comm., 230 Mo. App. 502, 92 S.W.2d 974(1936).
95. Ledlie N. Gamble, 35 Mo. App. 355 (1889).
96. Hyeronimus v. Allison, 52 Mo. 102 (1873).
97. Stone v. Johnston, 167 Mo. App. 456, 151 S.W. 987 (1912).
98. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (1920); Curry
v. Lackey, 35 Mo. 389 (1865); Sholz v. Mills, 176 Mo. App. 352, 158 S.W. 696(1913); Harmon v. The Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 170 Mo. App. 309, 156 S.W. 87(1913); Kent & Purdy Paint Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 165 Mo. App. 30, 146 S.W. 78(1912).
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and estimate the damage, conducting their proceedings in a fair and
business-like, but informal, manner." 9'
While appraisers are not required by law to conduct a hearing, if
the submission agreement stipulates a hearing or the appraisers de-
cide to conduct one, refusal to hear evidence offered may indicate
partiality, but only upon a showing that the evidence refused was
material or pertinent.V 0
Because the action is brought upon the contract of which the
agreement to appraise is a part (and not upon the appraisement it-
self, as in an arbitral award), there has been a tendency to measure
the appraiser's action by his complaince with the terms of the submis-
sion agreement. Thus, it has been said that the appraiser's duty to
act fairly arises by "clear and necessary implication" from the con-
tract sued upon, and failure to comply with the submission voids the
appraisement.4 " This failure of compliance need not imply fraud or
partiality on the part of the appraisers, and hence where one of the
appraisers was unaware of what the submission required him to do,
the appraisement was set aside in an equitable proceeding.0 2 Failure
of the appraisers to comply with the submission agreement is also
a defense at law for the reason that the party insisting upon the
validity of the appraisement must make a prima facie showing that
the appraisement was made in substantial compliance with the sub-
mission agreement' 03 Under the rule of construing conditions strictly
against the insurer, the failure of appraisers to fix the loss in the
precise manner required by the submission will void the appraise-
ment,04 and it also operates as a waiver of the condition precedent. 0 1
From what has just been said, it follows that partiality of an ap-
praiser resulting in prejudice to the rights of the complaining party
is a breach of the implied duty to act fairly in settling the question
of value submitted. Thus, -an appraisement is void where the ap-
praiser for the successful party dominates the proceeding,100 or has
99. Kent & Purdy Faint Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 165 Mo. App. 30, 48, 146 S.W.
78,83 (1912).
100. Leonard v. Cox, 64 Mo. 32 (1876).
101. Kent & Purdy Paint Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 165 Mo. App. 30, 146 S.W. 78(1912).
102. Ibid.
103., Security Printing Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 204 Mo. App. 390, 221
S.W. 430 (1920).
104. Blaetz v. National Fire Ins. Co., 293 S.W. 504 (Mo. App. 1927); Mound
City Roofing Tile Co. v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 395, 277
S.W. 349 (1925); Elliott v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 267 S.W. 441 (Mo. App.
1924).
105. Schusternan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 253 S.W. 85 (Mo. App. 1923);
'Security Printing Co. v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Mo. App. 422, 240 S.W. 263(1922).
106. Jones v. Orient Ins. Co., 184 Mo. App. 402, 171 S.W. 28 (1914).
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an economic interest in the outcome of the appraisal, 1 7 or where his
conduct amounts to fraud of any kind.20 And an action of deceit will
lie against the parties who procured the fraudulent appraisement.'0 1
Requirement of an Oath. At common law, neither the arbitrators
nor witnesses had to be sworn, according to the earlier Missouri
cases.,," That question today is in some doubt. In Ricknln, v.
White, I" a common-law award was sustained on the ground that the
parties had waived the oath which the court said was required of
arbitrators and witnesses in common-law arbitrations. -Four years
later the Springfield Court of Appeals, which had decided the Rick-
man case, sustained another common-law award arising out of pro-
ceedings described by the court as "informal in the extreme"; from
the few facts stated in the opinion it appears quite unlikely that
either arbitrators or witnesses were sworn; and the opinion makes
no reference to any requirement of an oath, or of waiver12 And
dicta in the relatively recent case of Continental Bank Supply Co. Vi.
International Brotherhood of Bookbinders"1 3, restates the older view
that an oath was not required in common-law proceedings.
Arbitrations under the statute, however, require the arbitrators
to be sworn "before proceeding to hear any testimony114 Since the
statute also empowers arbitrators to administer oaths,"5 it has been
construed as requiring witnesses to be sworn as well.", And where
the only written evidence that witnesses were sworn consisted of a
statement in the award that the arbitrators had heard "testimony" of
witnesses, this alone was held sufficient to support the presumption
that the witnesses were sworn." 7
Numerous early cases took the view that statutory proceedings
were completely invalid if the arbitrators or witnesses were not
sworn. I  But this gradually gave way. In Tucker 17. Allen,1 9 it was
held that the requirement of an oath could be expressly waived by
107. Orr v. Farmer's Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 356 Mo. 372, 201 S.W.2d 952 (1947);
Schwartzman v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 1089, 2 S.W.2d 593
(1928).
108. Non-tRoyalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 277 Mo. 399, 210 S.W.
87 { 1.9; Young v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 269 Mo. 1, 187 S.W. 856 (1916).
1t9. Holt v. Williams, 210 Mo. App. 470, 240 S.W. 864 (1922).
110. Williams v. Perkins, 83 Mo. 379 (1884); Mahan v. Perry, 5 Mo. 21
(8:,7).
l1. 266 S.W. 997 (Mo. App. 1924).
112. Dickens v. Luke, 2 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App. 1928).
113. 239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947).
114. Mo. RV. STAT. § 435.030 (1949); Toler v. Hayden, 18 Mo. 399 (1853).
115. Mo. Rm. STAT. § 435.040 (1949).
116. Cochran v. Bartle, 91 Mo. 636, 3 S.W. 854 (1887).
117. Reeves v. McGlochlin, 65 Mo. App. 537 (1896).
118. Fassett v. Fassett, 41 Mo. 516 (1868); Walt v. Huse, 38 Mo. 210 (1866);
Frissell v. Fickes, 27 Mo. 557 (1858); Bridgman v. Bridgman, 23 Mo. 272 (1856);
Toler V. Hayden, 18 Mo. 399 (1853).
119. 47 Mo. 448 (1871).
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the parties; and in Grafton Quarry Co. V. McCulay, 120 it was held
that no e~press agreement need be found to constitute a waiver of
the oath. The rule finally evolved that a party present and aware of
the failure to administer the oath was held to have waived it unless
he made timely objection.' 2 But if an oath is administered to arbi-
trators by one later found to be without authority to do so, this does
not operate as a waiver, the parties being presumed to have intended
that the arbitrators be properly sworil.122
. Appraisers, unless the submission requires it, are under no duty
to be sworn; nor since as a matter of law they are not even required
to hold hearings, is there any necessity to swear witnesses if the ap-
praisers choose to hear them.123
Notice" aud Opportunity to Be Heard. Parties to a common-law
submission have a right to notice of the arbitral hearing and to be
heard by the arbitrators; and an award rendered against a party
denied thes6 rights is void. In Tiffany v. Coffey, 24 a common-law
award unanimously rendered by three arbitrators was held void
against a party who had no notice of the appointment of a third
arbitrator, and who had been deprived of the right to be heard by
him. In the Tiffany case the court made this observation:
It is said that the submission did not provide for notice or a
hearing. This, however, will be implied. To arbitrate the dif-
ference between two or more disputants, from the very nature of
the duty imposed, necessarily carries along with it the necessity
of a hearing; and this, in turn, carries along with it the necessity
of notice in order that there may be a hearing.20
But where a party gives his assent to an award, with knowledge that
one of the arbitrators heard none of the evidence, he will not be al-
lowed thereafter to challenge the validity of the award.2 3
Similarly, under the arbitration statute the parties are entitled to
notice and an opportunity to be heard, since the statute provides
that the arbitrators ".... shall appoint a time and place for the hear-
ing and notify the parties thereof .... ."127 The statute does not fix
the amount of time in advance of the hearing that the parties must
be given notice, and the question appears not to have been litigated.
120. 7 Mo. App. 580 (1879).
121. Allen v. Hickam, 156 Mo. 49, 56 S.W. 309 (1900); Pope Construction Co.
v. Highway Comm., 230 Mo. App. 502, 92 S.W.2d 974 (1936) ;Beckett v. Wigles-
worth, 178 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1915); Karapschinsky v. Rothbaum, 177 Mo. App.
91, 163 S.W. 290 (1914).
122. Redman v. St. Joseph Hay and Grain Co., 209 Mo. App. 682, 239 S.W. 540
(1922).
123. See text following note 98 supra.
124. 142 Mo. App. 210, 125 S.W. 1178 (1910). Compare Rickman v. White, 266
S.W. 997 (Mo. App. 1924).
125. Tiffany v. Coffey, 142 Mo. App. 210, 213, 125 S.W. 1178, 1179 (1910).
126. Phillips v. Couch, 66 Mo. 219 (1877).
127. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.050 (1949).
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It has, however, been held that a party who appears on the day ap-
pointed for the hearing and participates in it without objection will
not be heard to complain thereafter that the notice given him was
inadequate.--
Apparently, once a party has received notice of the hearing, his
subsequent failure to appear on the day set does not amount to a
revocation of the submission agreement. Thus, a statutory award
has been sustained over the objection that it was misconduct for
the arbitrators to proceed with the hearing and the award in the
absence of one of the parties. 9
The statute also requires "all" the arbitrators to hear "... all the
proofs and allegations of the parties, pertinent or material to the
cause... .", Thus, an award is void where only two of the three
arbitrators participating in the award heard the evidence. 131 But
the requirement that "all" the arbitrators hear the evidence does
not mean all those provided for in the submission agreement. If
at the time of the arbitral hearing the parties agree to go ahead
before fewer arbitrators than were called for in the submission
agreement, an award rendered by those who heard the evidence
will be valid.1'
Apparently, too, the submission agreement may stipulate away the
requirement that those ultimately making the decision must hear the
evidence. Thus, where the submission provides that an appeal may
be taken from the arbitrators' award by having a "board of review"
in a trade association review the evidence taken by the original arbi-
trators, an award subsequently rendered by the board of review,
reversing the original award, has been held valid under the statute."3
As earlier discussed, none of the provisions relating to notice and
hearing apply to appraisers.'"
Forming the Award. At the common law, the unanimous con-
currence of the arbitrators was required to form a valid award in
the absence of a stipulation to the contrary in the submission.235
This stipulation need not be express; majority concurrence to render
a valid common-law award will be "inferred" where the submission
provides for the appointment of a third arbitrator only in the event
128. Price v. White, 27 Mo. 275 (1858).
129. Shroyer v. Barkley, 24 Mo. 346 (1857); Mitchell v. Curran, 1 Mo. App.
453 (1876).
130. Mo. Rm,. STAT. § 435.060 (1949).
131. Bowen v. Lazalere, 44 Mo. 383 (1869).
132. Hinkle v. Harris, 34 Mo. App. 223 (1889); Sweeney v. Vaudry, 2 Mo.
App. 352 (1876).
133. Mitchell v. Curran, 1 Mo. App. 453 (1876). Fernandes Grain Co. v.
Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W, 901 (1925) semble.
134. See text following note 98 supra.
135. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders,
239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947).
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of deadlock between the first two arbitrators appointed. 3 Caveat:
if the third arbitrator thus appointed has not heard the evidence,
an award thereafter rendered may be invalid for that reason, unless
the submission makes it clear that the third arbitrator will not be
required to hear the evidence. 737
While the arbitration statute requires all the arbitrators to hear
all the evidence, it also provides that ". . . every other act done by
a majority of them shall be valid ... [unless otherwise) expressly
required in the submission."'138 Thus, it is unnecessary for all the
arbitrators, after hearing the evidence, to sit down together there-
after, make the decision, and prepare the award; it is sufficient if
this is done by a majority of them.239
It is not clear from the cases whether the unanimous concurrence
of appraisers is required in the absence of stipulation in the submis-
sion. In Tureman it. Altman,140 the supreme court had before it an
agreement providing for an "appraisement" by "appraisers" of rent
under a long-term lease. The submission provided for the appoint-
ment of three "appraisers," but did not indicate whether all, or a
majority, of them had to concur in the "appraisement." Without
deciding whether the submission constituted an appraisal within
the Dworkin rule, supra, the court apparently assumed in making
its decision that unanimous agreement of the "appraisers" was nec-
essary. Where, however, the submission for appraisal stipulates that
a majority is sufficient to act, the fact that two of the appraisers,
without contacting the third, proceeded to fix the amount of loss
under a fire policy has been held insufficient to upset the appraisement
without a further showing of partiality."4'
In fashioning the award, arbitrators are bound by the terms of
the submission agreement. As previously noted, statutory awards
may be vacated on the grounds, among others: "That the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or that they so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter was not
made.1' 4 2 The rule here stated is understood to apply as well to
common-law awards. 43
Because the submission agreement defines the controversy which
the parties wish determined, the scope of the arbitral hearing can not
be enlarged, over the objection of one of the parties, to include mat-
136. Fleming v. KCKN Broadcasting Co., 233 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App. 1950).
137. Tiffany v. Coffey, 142 Mo. App. 210, 125 S.W. 1178 (1910). See note 124
sutpra.
138. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 435.060 (1949).
139. Higgins-Wall-Dyer v. St. Louis, 331 Mo. 454, 53 S.W.2d 864 (1932).
140. 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (1951).
141. Pierce's Loan Co. v. Netherlands Fire and Ins. Co., 200 S.W. 120 (Mo.
App. 1918).
142. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 435.100 (4) (1949).
143. See text to note 79 supra.
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ters not submitted, and the award, therefore, can not embrace mat-
ters outside the submission.14 Thus, where the parties agreed to
submit "divers matters of dispute between us," the unsuccessful
party may introduce parol evidence to show that matters not in dis-
pute when the submission was agreed on had been included in the
award1 45 On the other hand, if matters not included in the submis-
sion are heard by the arbitrators without objection by the parties,
it is proper for the award to embrace these, and the unsuccessful
party can not protest that the award covered matters not originally
submitted. 4 1 And if a party manifests his assent to an award which
he knows embraces matters not submitted, he will not be allowed
thereafter to object that the award touches on matters not originally
submitted."47
Whether an award covering matters outside the submission is
wholly invalid, or merely invalid as to those matters outside the
submission, is not altogether clear. In Squires v. Anderson,1 48 an
action had been brought upon an award rendered under a submission
calling for a balance of account between two former partners. The
controversy centered around the inclusion in the award of an item
charged against the defendant, which item was larger than the whole
award rendered in the plaintiff's favor. Stating the rule to be that
if the arbitrators ".... assume to act on questions not submitted, or
fail to follow the directions in the submission in a material point,
their award in reference to such matters will not be binding, either
on questions of law or of fact.. .""1 the item was held to be outside
the submission agreement. Thus, a judgment for the defendant was
sustained because, with that item excluded, the award was no longer
in the plaintiff's favor.
Ten years after it decided the Squires case, the supreme court held,
in Ellison v. Weathers,150 that if portions of the award were sepa-
rable, those relating to matters properly submitted would stand.
Six years later, in Hinkle v. Harris,151 the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals cited the Squires case for the proposition that "if the arbi-
trators assume to act on questions or matters not submitted, their
award will not be binding,"'1 '  and struck down an entire award with-
out considering the question of severability. No other case found
144. Hinkle v. Harris, :34 Mo. App. 223 (1889).
145. Ibid.
146. Price v. White, 27 Mo. 275 (1858); McClure v. Shroyer, 13 Mo. 104
(1850).
1.47. Ellison v. Weathers, 78 Mo. 115 (1883).
148. 54 Mo. 193 (1873).
41 !. Id. at 197.
150. 78 Mo. 115 (1883).
151. 34 Mo. App. 223 (1889).
152. 1d. at 232.
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rules squarely on the point, although the rule quoted above from the
Squires case has been repeated in dicta.1"3
The question as to validity of an award where the arbitrators
failed to consider all matters submitted has apparently been litigated
only to the extent of holding that the unsuccessful party can not
object to an award where the omitted matter would have been favor-
able to the other party, and not himself.5
The arbitrators must fashion an award which is clear and definite.
Thus, where the award gave the successful party the option of two
possible solutions, it was held too indefinite in that it failed to resolve
the controversy. 1r5 But an award, indefinite because it fails to settle
the controversy, may be cured when the parties thereafter agree
upon one of the alternatives, and thus resolve the uncertainty.110
Arbitrators may, in making the award, charge the costs of arbi-
tration against the unsuccessful party.Y' These costs may include
fees payable to the arbitrators, but in the absence of a stipulation to
the contrary, the statute fixes the arbitrator's fee at $2.50 a day,""
and a statutory award will be modified where the arbitrators, with-
out express authority to do so, charge fees in excess of the statutory
amount.1 59 And it has been held that in awarding damages for tres-
pass in removing trees from property, arbitrators cannot award
treble damages in the absence of a stipulation to that effect in the
submission.16o
The award, if in writing, must be signed by the arbitrators agree-
ing to it, whether it is a proceeding at common lawO01 or under the
statute. 62 The statute adds the further requirement that the award
must also be attested by a subscribing witness. 6 3 Until attested, the
statutory award is incomplete, and arbitrators are not rendered
functus officio by delivering copies of the award to the parties. The
arbitrators may, therefore, recall the award thus delivered for pur-
poses of having it attested.'" But a motion to enter judgment upon
the award will be denied where the award has been filed with the
court prior to attestation and the prevailing party, without a court
153. Thatcher Implement and Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627,
187 S.W. 117 (1916).
154. Beckett v. Wiglesworth, 178 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1915).
155. Pitman v. Irby, 181 S.W. 590 (Mo. App. 1916).
156. Ellison v. Weathers, 78 Mo. 115 (1883); Dickens v. Luke, 2 S.W.2d 161
(Mo. App. 1928. STAT. § 435.230 (1949); McClure v. Shroyer, 13 Mo. 104 (1860).
158. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.280 (1949).
159. Beckett v. Wiglesworth, 178 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1915).
160. Frissell v. Fickes, 27 Mo. 557 (1858).
161. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders,
239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947).
162. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 435.070 (1949).
163. Ibid.
164. Newman v. Labeaume, 9 Mo. 30 (1845).
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order, removes it to have it attested; his proper remedy would have
been a motion to modify and correct the award filed together with
the motion to confirm.1' But even though a motion to confirm the
award has been denied for want of attestation, the award, if later
attested, will be a bar to a suit brought on the same matter.116
Once, however, the award has been made, signed, attested and
delivered, the arbitrators are functus officio, and without obtaining
fresh authority from the parties they can not later issue a "corrected"
award.- 7 More or less comparable is the case of Inman V. Kel,2C8
where three common-law arbitrators viewed the property in dispute,
advised one of the parties to pay all but $300 of the contract price
immediately and suggested that the balance could be decided upon
later. When, seven or eight months after this, the arbitrators sought
to render an award as to the balance without notifying the parties
or hearing further evidence, they were held to be without authority
to make such an award.
Appraisers avoid for the most part the problem of whether their
appraisements touch upon matters not submitted to them; on the
other hand, appraisers are held quite strictly to the terms and im-
plications of the submission. 169
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AWARD
If both parties to an arbitral proceeding are content to abide the
award and consider the matter over and done with, there is no real
reason why anything further be done after the award has been
rendered.
The traditional method at the common law, when one of the parties
refused to accept the award, was to bring an action based upon the
award itself. The theory behind this was that the original cause of
action submitted had merged with the award, and the award there-
after created a new cause of action.,," The defenses at law to an ac-
tion on the award were few. It was a question of law for the court
whether the award covered matters outside the submission.'71 About
the only questions conceivably presenting issues for the jury dealt
with whether a submission agreement had been entered and an award
rendered."-1
Relief from the award, if any, was confined to equity. And even
equity would not set aside an award for errors of fact or law in the
145. Field v. Oliver, 43 Mo. 200 (1869).
166. Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 (1871).
167. Brown and Moore v. Durham, 110 Mo. App. 424, 85 S.W. 120 (1905).
168. 206 S.W. 403 (Mo. App. 1918).
169. See text to notes 101-105 supra.
170. Searles v. Lune, 81 Mo. App. 607 (1899).
171. Ellison v. Weathers, 78 Mo. 115 (1883).
172. Thatcher Implement & Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187
S.W. 117 (1916).
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absence of partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators.""
There was, of course, no jury trial at equity.
As noted in the Introduction, the existing Missouri arbitration
statute was enacted in what is substantially its present form in 1835.
By requiring that arbitrators and witnesses be sworn, that a decision
by a majority rather than all of the arbitrators is all that is neces-
sary for a valid award, and that the award be attested by a sub-
scribing witness, the statute did introduce some procedural changes
unknown in common-law arbitrations. But the biggest change intro-
duced by the statute was what has been described as "a quick bill
in equity."' 74 This consisted of a summary motion practice-to con-
firm, vacate, modify or correct an award-with the provision that
judgment could be entered immediately thereafter upon an award
confirmed or modified, and further providing that an appeal could be
taken from that judgment, or from an order vacating the award.75
The grounds available in equity for setting aside an award were
carried over into the statute to provide the basis for a motion to
vacate the award. Proof under these motions was to be by affidavit,
and there was no jury trial on the motion proceedings."70 The advan-
tages of the new system were speed and simplicity.
The statute expressly provided that nothing therein shall impair
the authority of the court of equity over the awards of arbitrators.' 77
And the statute has uniformly been construed as furnishing a remedy
concurrent with that of common-law arbitrations.'78
Common-law arbitrations and awards continue to exist. For the
same reason that an action may be brought on a common-law award,
an award may also be pleaded as a bar to an action on the same
matter.7 9 And when an action is brought upon the award, it is no
defense that the cause of action originally submitted to arbitration
is barred by the statute of limitations at the time the action is
brought on the award.280 The defendant, however, is free to set up
any valid counterclaims when an action is brought against him on
an award.'8" Presumably, with the full merger of law and equity
into one form of action,182 the defendant may set up as a defense
against an action on an award any grounds which might have been
sufficient to set the award aside for corruption or partiality in equity,
although no cases so deciding have been found.
173. See text to notes 78-97 supro.
174. Koerner v. Leathe, 149 M 'o. 61, 51 S.W. 96 (1899).
175. Mo. RFv. STAT. §§ 435.080-435.200 (1949).
176. Koerner v. Leathe, 149 Mo. 361, 51 S.W. 96 (1899).
177. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 435.240 (1949).
178. Fleming v. KCKN Broadcasting Co., 233 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App. 1950).
179. Hamlin v. Duke, 28 Mo. 166 (1859).
180. Searles v. Lum, 81 Mo. App. 607 (1899).
181. Pearce v. Mctntyre, 29 Mo. 423 (1860).
182. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 506.040 (1949).
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Since the arbitration statute expressly leaves equitable jurisdic-
tion unimpaired, presumably it is still open to a party to bring a
civil action, equitable in nature, to set an award aside.
A successful party to a statutory award has a number of courses
open to him. If the award is accepted by the other party, and the
matter is settled, he may wish to let it go at that. If, for the record,
he wishes to have the award confirmed and a judgment entered
upon it, he must first serve a copy of the award and the motion upon
the other party at least fifteen days prior to filing the award in
court. *: The statute has been construed as permitting the filing of
the award in court at any time within one year of publication of the
award; the motion need not have been ruled upon in that time.14 If
the motion to confirm is not filed within a year, this simply deprives
the prevailing party of the statutory procedure; the award remains
a subsisting thing, and an action comparable to that which may be
maintained upon a common-law award may be brought.a85 So, too,
if the other party brings an action on the same matter, prior to con-
firmation of the award, the award may be set up as a bar to the action
and the defendant may also file a motion to confirm at that time if
the suit is brought within a year of publication of the award.'"
The unsuccessful party to the award has a number of courses open
as well. He could, of course, bring an action on the subject matter
of the award, thus creating the suit described in the last sentence
of the above paragraph, and if the defendant files a motion to con-
firm the award in connection with pleading the award as a bar to the
action, the plaintiff is free, by way of reply, to file a motion to vacate,
provided he can do so within the time fixed by the statute for filing
a motion to vacate.17 The statute requires that a motion to vacate,
or a motion to modify or correct the award, be filed at the next term
of court following the publication of the award, provided this may
be clone and still give the other party a ten-day notice of the mo-
tion., - The situation has occasionally developed that a party in
whose favor the award is rendered has postponed filing a motion
to confirm the award until after the time allowed for filing a motion
to vacate the award has run. When this occurs, a motion filed to
vacate the award after the time fixed by statute must be overruled.7 9
183. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.090 (1949).
184. Kirby v. Heaton, 315 Mo. 338, 286 S.W. 76 (1926).
185. Beall v. Board of Trade of Kansas City, 164 Mo. App. 186, 148 S.W. 386
1912).
IS. Redman v. St. Joseph Hay and Grain Co., 209 Mo. App. 682, 239 S.W. 540
1922).
187. Ibid.
188. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435,120 (1949).
189. Shores v. Bowen, 44 Mo. 396 (1869); Reeves v. McGlochlin, 65 Mo. App.
37 (1896).
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While the motion to vacate under these circumstances has been over-
ruled, there is at least one case in which the unsuccessful party was
permitted to file a pleading essentially equitable in nature to the
prevailing party's motion to confirm.290
The unsuccessful party to the award is not confined to a motion
to vacate a statutory award, and even if such a motion has been filed,
it is not, until it has been ruled on, a bar to bringing an action in
equity to vacate the award.y"O But a separate equitable proceeding
will stay a ruling on a motion to confirm only if the equitable proceed-
ing is begun before the motion to confirm is filed.192 And while in
terms of vulnerability of the award the equitable proceeding and
the motion to vacate are equivalent, the advantage asserted for the
equitable remedy is that it permits a final adjudication of the parties'
rights, where a motion to vacate simply sets the award aside and
compels the parties to start over. 93
Because both the motion to vacate and the corresponding equitable
remedy raise essentially the question of partiality or bad faith on
the part of one or more of the arbitrators, it may be pertinent to
observe that once an arbitrator has joined in signing the award, his
testimony or affidavit is inadmissible for purposes of impeaching
the award." But where an arbitrator neither assists in making the
decision, nor signs the award, his testimony is admissible to show
acts of misconduct on the part of the other arbitrators.'
The finality of appraisements has been tested primarily in actions
brought on the contract, or policy of fire insurance, or lease, of which
the appraisal was a part. To this end, the test of the appraisement
has been whether it was made in compliance with the submission
agreement, and, by finding in the contract an implied duty on the
part of the appraiser to make the valuation "in a fair and business-
like, but informal, manner,"' 19 it gradually became possible to raise
the issue of the appraiser's alleged partiality in an action at law on
the contract. But an action on the contract at law is not the sole
remedy available to a party aggrieved by an appraisement; equitable
proceedings as well are available to set appraisements asidel9 7
190. Shores v. Bowen, 44 Mo. 396 (1869).
191. Pacific Lime & Gypsum Co. v. Mo. Bridge & Iron Co., 286 Mo. 112, 226
S.W. 853 (1920).
192. Shawhan v. Baker, 167 Mo. App. 25, 150 S.W. 1096 (1912).
193. Ibid.
194. Ellison v. Weathers, 78 Mo. 115 (1883); Taylor v. Scott, 26 Mo. App. 249(1887).
195. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders,239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947).
196. Kent & Purdy Paint Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 165 Mo. App. 30, 48, 146 S.W.
78, 83 (1912).




While both arbitrations and appraisals are capable of performing
numerous useful services under Missouri law as it presently stands,
anyone seriously considering the use of either procedure will find
useful an understanding of things which cannot, with certainty, be
accomplished by them.
The sweeping force of the revocability doctrine, applicable alike
to common-law and statutory arbitrations, renders uncertain at the
outset the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling disputes.
So long as either party is free to revoke the submission agreement
at any time during the arbitral hearing, there exists always the like-
lihood that a paity, watching the accumulation of events during the
hearing, may see the handwriting on the wall and revoke the sub-
mission. Once this is done, the entire affair is at an end, and the
parties are left where they began-with their dispute still unresolved.
In short, whether an agreement to arbitrate is consumated by a
binding award primarily rests upon the good faith of the parties
in standing by the method they have selected for resolving their
disputes.
In the past thirty years or so, numerous other states have seen
fit to adopt legislation making submission agreements irrevocable
and specifically enforceable through summary motion practice com-
parable to that now used in Missouri for confirming or vacating
awards. New York, whose 1829 arbitration statute provided the
model upon which the present Missouri legislation was patterned,
has been a leader in shaping this more modern view of arbitration,
and its present arbitration statute but little resembles its legislation
of a century and a quarter ago.""
A further limitation upon the utility of common-law and statutory
arbitrations in Missouri is the requirement that only controversies in
existence when the submission is agreed upon are proper subjects of
arbitration. It must be admitted that this is not an unendurable
hardship because the parties are, of course, under present Missouri
arbitration law, perfectly free to submit particular controversies
after each arises. But the present rule does deny the parties the op-
portunity of including in their contracts a provision that all dis-
putes arising under the contract shall be submitted to arbitration
under a prescribed set of standards.
Such provisions can be of considerable convenience to parties who
visualize continuing contractual relations over a period of years. For
them, economic necessity often commands prompt decision of dis-
agreements, and for this reason, a decision-any decision reasonably
198. N.Y. CIn. PRAc. ACT §§ 1448-1469.
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arrived at-is often more valuable economically than an answer
arrived at months or years later after costly and time-consuming
litigation. True, as already indicated, they could enter individual sub-
mission agreements to handle each new matter, but this is manifestly
less convenient than a more or less standardized submission clause
in each contract. In this instance, too, the more modern statutes have
corrected this by permitting submission of present or future con-
troversies.
Still another limitation is imposed upon statutory arbitrations by
the requirement that only matters which might be the subject of an
action may be submitted. As pointed out in the Continental Bani
Supply Co. case,199 common-law submissions are not so limited, and
thus where parties seeking to negotiate a contract, wish to submit
disagreements over terms to be included in the contract, they must
resort to common-law submissions. As a matter of logic, there seems
no reasonable basis for denying them the use of summary motion
procedure for judicial enforcement of the award.
The two limitations last suggested-viz., that only existing dis-
putes may be submitted, and that under the statute the controversy
must be one which might be the subject of an action-do not bar the
parties from entering such submissions, but if they choose to do so,
it must be in recognition of the fact that ultimate enforcement of the
award will have to rest upon something other than court- action.
Even conceding the existence of these more or less important limi-
tations upon Missouri abitrations, it none the less remains true that
things which can be done by arbitration in Missouri at present make
that procedure a useful and relatively inexpensive means of settling
many kinds of controversies. And there is an important role which
the bar may play in helping to make arbitration under the present
rules a more effective device for settling disputes.
Every practicing attorney is aware of the widespread use of out-of-
court settlements impelled in part at least by crowded court dockets
and high costs of litigation. In many such situations, arbitration may
be an effective and desirable device for handling such problems; and
this is not to suggest that the attorney's role in arbitration is unim-
portant.
Submission agreements drafted by competent legal craftsmen could
have obviated many of the disputes litigated in the foregoing cases.
If the parties seeking to fix the rental value under a long-term lease,
or the price of property to be transferred in a contract of sale, had
intended that the appraisers should fx the value without hearing evi-
dence of the parties, the submission agreement could have said so.
199. See text to notes 20 and 21 supra.
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And if it had been intended that an umpire, brought in only after dis-
agreement arose between the arbitrators, was not required to hear the
evidence, the submission could have stated this, too. And so, likewise,
with the question of whether the arbitrators or witnesses were re-
quired to take an oath.
The attorney, too, can greatly aid a client in the preparation of
material for the arbitral hearing, and if the parties wish it, they may
stipulate in their submission the right to be represented by counsel
in the arbitral hearing.
With respect to formation of the award, if doubt arises as to
whether particular findings were authorized by the original submis-
sion, legal guidance may assist in shaping an award in which these
findings are sufficiently separable that the remainder of the award
may stand in the event certain matters are later held to have been
outside submission.
For the arbitral process to be effective, however, the parties them-
selves must have confidence in arbitration as a method. They must
recognize and accept the fact that the proceedings are informal, not
governed by rules of evidence and procedure followed by the courts;
that errors of law in ruling on matters of substance are occasionally
to be expected, since the arbitral process visualizes reaching a rea-
sonable result and not one which must conform strictly to the rules
of substantive law followed by the courts.
Where this is done, as the cases discussed reflect, arbitration is an
effective, inexpensive and prompt method of resolving disputes.
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